



IMPROVING ACCESS TO WATER ALLOCATION TRADE BETWEEN ZONES IN THE SOUTHERN MURRAY- DARLING BASIN

WHAT WE HEARD AND WHERE TO NEXT (OCTOBER 2026)



Energy,
Environment
and Climate Action

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Executive summary

WaterNSW and the Victorian Department of Energy, Environment and Climate Action (DEECA) have been working together to improve how access to water allocation trade is made available during competitive trade openings in the Murray, Goulburn and Murrumbidgee systems. This report builds on the joint options assessment published in May 2026 and presents what the agencies heard from stakeholders during recent consultation on the assessment findings and sets out the next steps for WaterNSW and DEECA to implement improvements.

Community feedback throughout this project has highlighted how important water markets have become to how people, businesses and agencies manage their water needs. As a result, access to the Barmah, Goulburn and Murrumbidgee trade opportunities is highly valued and participants want there to be equitable access to these opportunities.

During the recent consultation on the assessment of options, WaterNSW and DEECA heard a range of views from irrigators, irrigation groups, industry bodies, and brokers, with feedback was collected through surveys, email submissions and targeted consultation sessions.

The feedback showed that **most stakeholders supported randomisation** as their preferred option for providing access to scheduled Barmah, Goulburn and Murrumbidgee trade opportunities. This was generally because stakeholders believe this option supports the greatest equity of access. Those who had experience participating in recent trade openings under randomisation generally considered the approach to be operating effectively in practice and identified simplicity and ease of administration as key strengths. Some stakeholders provided feedback on specific options and refinements, including:

- Whether the first-in, first served option for Murrumbidgee trade openings should be retained given it is an established and transparent system and trade opportunities are not as competitive as they are for Barmah and Goulburn.
- Whether there the costs and benefits of a blind auction have been sufficiently explored.
- Proposals to refine the randomisation approach to introduce limits on application volumes in response to the concentration of trade opportunity likely to be obtained by large water holders.

We also heard concerns about the large volume of intervalley trade applications by the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH) for Goulburn trade opportunities since randomisation commenced. There was strong interest from stakeholders in understanding why CEWH need to compete with consumptive water users for scarce intervalley trade opportunities in light of the alternative mechanisms for environmental water holders to move water from the Goulburn to the Murray.

WaterNSW and DEECA have considered this feedback and developed a ‘where to from here’ plan to implement improvements to how trade openings are managed that align with community expectations. Key elements include:

- For Barmah scheduled openings, WaterNSW and DEECA will:
 - Continue to implement randomisation as the long-term approach.
 - Investigate opportunities to refine processes to improve efficiency and transparency.
 - Adjust the scheduling of trade openings to open randomisation on the day after, not the same day, as seasonal determinations, subject to operational capabilities.
- For Goulburn scheduled openings, DEECA will:
 - Continue to implement randomisation as the long-term approach.
 - Investigate opportunities to refine processes to improve efficiency and transparency.
 - Adjust the scheduling of trade openings to open randomisation on the day after, not the same day, as seasonal determinations.
 - Develop formal public guidance for statutory agencies, including environmental water holders, to support these agencies to participate in the Victorian market and competitive trade openings in a transparent manner and ensure their actions do not distort the market.
- For Murrumbidgee openings, WaterNSW will investigate implementing randomisation.

Introduction

Project overview

WaterNSW and the Victorian Department of Energy, Environment and Climate Action (DEECA) are progressing with three stages of work to improve how access to water allocation trade is made available in the Murray, Goulburn and Murrumbidgee systems (Figure 1).

This report presents what WaterNSW and DEECA heard during the stage 2 consultation (what we heard) and describes how the stage 2 findings will be implemented (where to from here).




Figure 1. Three stages of work to improve access to trade opportunities (current stage circled in red)

Documents published during stages 1 and 2 (including the principles-based assessment framework, options assessments and stage 1 consultation summary) are available among the consultation documents on the [Engage Victoria](#) and [Trading water - WaterNSW](#) websites.

Consultation process

Public consultation on the options assessments was conducted from 18 May to 14 June 2026.

A joint consultation report summarising the outcomes of the options assessments, together with the full consultant reports for the Barmah, Goulburn and Murrumbidgee scheduled intervalley trade openings were published on 18 May 2026 on [Engage Victoria](#) and [Trading water - WaterNSW](#) websites.

During the consultation period, an online survey was available for stakeholders to submit views on the options assessments and ensure they had the opportunity to provide feedback. The specific consultation questions asked were:

- *Considering the assessment results, do you agree that randomisation is the most suitable option?*
- *Do you agree or disagree with the assessment against the assessment framework principles?*
- *Is there any other information that has been overlooked in the options assessment or needs to be considered by WaterNSW and DEECA in developing a final recommendation for each trade limit?*

A public webinar was held on 21 May 2026. The webinar recording was subsequently made available on the [Engage Victoria](#) website.

During the consultation period, DEECA and WaterNSW provided nine additional presentations and consultation sessions to interested groups. Refer to Appendix 1 for a list of these engagement activities.

Who we heard from

Feedback was received from a range of stakeholders across both Victoria and NSW, this included irrigators, industry representatives, water brokers and other interested stakeholders, including people with direct experience of trade openings.

A summary of who we heard from is provided in *Figure 2*.




Figure 2. Summary of stakeholder engagement

What we heard

This section presents a synthesis of feedback received through all consultation channels including selected comments from stakeholders, provided to illustrate the range of views received during consultation.¹

Support for randomisation

Feedback received through this consultation process showed that most stakeholders support randomisation as the most equitable method for allocating limited trade opportunity when demand exceeds available capacity, particularly for scheduled Goulburn and Barmah openings.

Some feedback expressed unqualified support for randomisation, citing its distinct benefit of removing the advantage afforded by speed, automation, or technological resources under first-in, first served. Supportive stakeholders considered randomisation to provide a fairer basis for allocating limited trade opportunity when demand exceeds available capacity.

Stakeholders who had direct experience participating in Goulburn and Barmah trade openings using randomisation generally reported that it was operating effectively in practice. Simplicity and ease of administration were also identified as strengths of randomisation.

"Randomisation is the fairest option for all water users" – Water user

"Randomisation removes the advantage of speed alone, gives all eligible applications an equal chance of success, and is simple to communicate and administer" – Industry representative

"I disagree with all options except the Randomisation option. Other options disadvantage some users and are not fair to all" – Water user

Some stakeholders proposed refinements to the randomisation arrangements used for Goulburn and Barmah to address their concerns that the method has still resulted in large water holders (for example those that can submit multiple trade applications for multiple gigalitres of trade opportunity) obtaining a significant proportion of the opportunity. Further details of these concerns are presented below under 'other issues raised'. Proposed refinements included placing limits on the number of applications that can be submitted by a single party or capping the total volume that can be included within an individual application, to further promote a more equitable distribution of allocation.

"Without measures to restrict applications, Randomisation risks being gamed by well-resourced participants in the same way as first-in, first served" – Industry representative

There was some support for extending randomisation to Murrumbidgee trade openings. Stakeholders supporting this approach considered that the equity benefits identified for Barmah and Goulburn would also apply in the Murrumbidgee. However, there was concern that implementation should not be delayed indefinitely while system changes are developed.

"We support extending randomisation to Murrumbidgee openings, but implementation should not be deferred indefinitely. In the interim, measures such as an extended application window should be considered while an auditable randomisation tool is developed" – Industry body

¹ In some instances, representative comments drawn from written submissions have been edited for grammar, spelling and readability. The intent and meaning of stakeholder feedback has been preserved.

Support for first-in, first served in the Murrumbidgee

Support for retaining first-in, first served was expressed by a small number of industry stakeholders specifically focussed on Murrumbidgee trade openings. These stakeholders said concerns regarding equity could be addressed through limits on application volumes rather than changes to the underlying access method. They emphasised that randomisation alone would not address equity concerns, as unrestricted applications could still consume a significant proportion of the available trade opportunity, reiterating concerns described above that large water holders could obtain a significant proportion of the opportunity under randomisation unless limits on applications were introduced.

One stakeholder commented that randomisation may be less suitable in the Murrumbidgee system, where there is less consistent competition for trade opportunities. They suggested that retaining first-in, first served may be appropriate in the Murrumbidgee context, noting their preference for a more automated trading platform rather than the current email-based process.

“There is nothing wrong with the current First In, First Served process other than there being no limit on individual trade application volumes” – Irrigation group

“Randomisation alone does not resolve the inequity as it remains possible for a few large applications to take up most of the trade opportunity” – Irrigation group

Feedback on blind auction

Feedback on the blind-auction reflected differing views regarding auction-based approaches.

While no stakeholders expressed explicit support for the blind auction option as a preferred option, there were concerns the assessments had not been sufficiently explored for this option and contained factual errors.² Further investigation of the feasibility, implementation requirements, and costs of auction systems, including engagement with existing market platform providers, may have provided additional evidence regarding the practicality of a blind auction. One stakeholder highlighted that pricing access to trade opportunity could reduce speculative trading and support more efficient allocation distribution by directing available water to participants with the highest value use and reduce price differences between zones.

“Putting a price on trade capacity means less speculation in the market – those who need the water to grow a crop will pay for it, meaning water moves to where it is needed, supply shocks are reduced in low availability seasons and price differences between zones are reduced” – Broker

Other stakeholders raised concerns that an auction mechanism would add complexity without a clear benefit, and that auctions may favour participants with greater financial resources.

Consistent with feedback received during Stage 1 consultation, stakeholders also raised questions about how any revenue generated through an auction process would be used. The use of auction revenue has not been considered as part of this assessment and would need to be determined by relevant governments if an auction-based approach is ever pursued.

² A factual error was identified in *Improving access to water allocation trade between MDB zones: Barmah and Goulburn options assessment by Frontier Economics* (p.44, Box 2: Complex trading platforms). For clarity, Expansiv's platforms facilitate multiple trading methods designed for high frequency trading. Expansiv's platforms generally use a Central Limit Order Book, allowing participants to view live market depth and execute trades instantly 24/7 rather than waiting for a specific bidding window. On the CBL platform, participants trade standardised spot contracts like Global Emissions Offsets and complex gas products such as Methane Performance Certificates. This effectively separates the "environmental attribute" from the physical commodity. H2OX, a subsidiary of Expansiv facilitates water trading from live, firm execution, replacing older "bulletin" systems where offers are non-binding. The H2OX trading platform allows periodic auctions to be run.

Feedback on proportional application and proportional entitlement options

Support for the proportional application option was limited. One stakeholder expressed some support for the approach, noting a view that it may be more likely to benefit water users than investors. They suggested that investors may be less interested in participating where they could not be certain of securing their desired trade volume.

This view differed to findings from the options assessment, which identified water users may be impacted by uncertainty regarding the volume that would be successfully traded, especially seeking to secure sufficient allocation volumes to meet irrigation requirements.

No support was expressed for the proportional entitlement option. Some stakeholders found this option less intuitive and sought further explanation during consultation. One participant raised concerns that the broad distribution of available allocation under this approach could disadvantage smaller businesses by resulting in relatively insignificant trade volumes being available to individual participants.

Feedback on the application of the assessment framework

The surveys specifically asked stakeholders whether they agreed or disagreed with the assessment of each option against the assessment framework principles.

Most stakeholders focused their feedback on the merits of individual options rather than the detailed assessment findings related to each principle. There was very little comment on the specific application of the assessment framework, suggesting general acceptance of the overall assessment approach and findings.

A few stakeholders provided feedback on broader aspects of the options assessment process and the scope of the consultant reports. These stakeholders expressed a view that the assessment may have been constrained by budgetary or implementation considerations, which may have influenced the resulting recommendations.

Some stakeholders also questioned aspects of the evidence base used in the assessment, including assumptions regarding the feasibility, implementation requirements and costs of alternative options. There was a view that the assessment findings appeared to align with existing arrangements, leading to questions about the value of the assessment process and whether alternative options had been sufficiently explored. As mentioned earlier in this report, it was suggested that more engagement with market platform providers and other industry participants could have strengthened the analysis of auction-based systems.

Note on the scope of this project:

This project was designed to identify the type of options that would support equitable, efficient and transparent access to competitive trade openings, rather than a comprehensive review of water trading systems and detailed implementation processes. The feedback received from consultation on the framework and options assessment have provided WaterNSW and DEECA important information about the market's expectations and have informed the implementation plans.

“The scope of the work was restrictive and in large part a huge waste of taxpayer money. The outcomes were largely predetermined and were in line with what was already considered the best outcome and in line with budgetary constraints” – Irrigator

“Additional issues of Broker's trading allocation and automated systems for trading available opportunities were not considered in anyway whatsoever” - Irrigator

“I believe neither state had any funds available for changing legislation. Not sure this had ever been presented to market participants and would therefore limit every other alternative being considered which in turn means there was no point in considering any other alternative than the status quo” – Broker

Other issues raised

Limits on trade applications

A recurring theme through consultation on stages 1 and 2 has been concern about concentration of trade opportunity among a small number of large water holders and water brokers. Stakeholders have suggested a range of measures that could be considered as refinements to address this concern, including limits on application numbers, limits on application volumes, restrictions on related-party applications, and caps on the volume of trade approvals that can be secured by a single participant.

“One of the biggest issues in trade access has been that there is currently no limit on trade volumes per application. This results in the well-resourced entities with large volumes of trade taking up the capacity of the trade volume available in a minimal number of applications” – Irrigator group

“We reiterate the need for safeguards including caps on the number of applications per entity, caps on the total volume transferred by a single party, and restrictions on related-party and broker-led trades, underpinned by a genuine user-to-user trade principle. Without such measures, randomisation risks being gamed by well-resourced participants in the same way as the current system” - Industry body

Participation of environmental water holders

Another recurring theme through consultation stages 1 and 2 has been the participation by environmental water holders in contested trade openings when there is an alternative mechanism (pre-requisite policy measures³) to move environmental water between trading zones. In particular, concerns focussed on the Goulburn trade rule, where the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder has accessed a sizable proportion (up to 20%) of the trade opportunity made available in recent scheduled openings via randomisation. Stakeholders shared views about the volume of water environmental water holders can trade and their relative need for access to limited trade opportunity.

“This project should clearly define the parameters for environmental water holders’ participation in highly contested openings, particularly when alternative conveyance is available, so that scarce capacity is not diverted from productive use” – Industry body

Note on the environmental water holder participation

Environmental water holders participate in the Murray-Darling Basin water market to help achieve environmental outcomes more efficiently and flexibly. Importantly, the Murray-Darling Basin's water trading framework is based on the principle of open and efficient water markets. The Basin Plan water trading rules are designed to reduce unnecessary restrictions on trade and apply to all market participants, including environmental water holders.

³ Pre-requisite policy measures enable environmental water holders to have water delivered from storages on top of existing flows to achieve a target in-stream hydrograph and to have *return flows* shepherded for use downstream in real time, where this can be done without unacceptable impacts to other entitlement holders. These measures improve the efficiency and effectiveness of water recovered for environmental use, allowing environmental water holders to achieve greater outcomes and reducing the volume of environmental water recovery that would be required to achieve comparable environmental benefits.

Water market objectives and rules

A few stakeholders expressed support for the long-standing principles of the National Water Initiative (2004), consistent with how they were included in the assessment framework. This included support for removing barriers to trade while protecting the rights of the environment and third parties and highlighting the importance of transparency and equity of access. A few stakeholders also raised concerns that the options to improve access to trade opportunities are constrained by the current “cancel/issue” model of allocation trade which allow allocation characteristics to be transformed by trade.

*“Freeing up trade opportunities, should not undermine property rights of water entitlement holders or negatively impacts property rights of farming land, adjoining rivers or creek systems through overbank flows”
– Irrigator group*

“Every participant should have equal access to the market. The market must be transparent and equitable. Water is the commodity - not a big water user, not a small water user, not a water investment fund, not a retired farmer who kept his entitlement” – Broker

“For equity water allocation MUST maintain its original characteristics” – Irrigator group

A small number of stakeholders raised broader concerns regarding water sharing rules, trade rules, river operations and constraints. These matters have been noted, although relate to operational and policy issues and are outside the scope of this project.

Interstate equity at Barmah

There was some interest in how the Barmah trade opportunity is equitably shared between Victorian and NSW participants. There were concerns in both directions – with one person concerned that the trade opportunity on 1 July was disproportionately received by NSW due to large trade parcel sizes, and another concerned that ad hoc trade opportunities were captured entirely by Victorian account holders and recommended introducing a trigger for ad hoc openings to be brought under the scheduled randomisation.

“From a Victorian irrigator’s perspective, the odds are very unfairly stacked against us” – Irrigator

“We accept the pragmatic rationale for retaining first-in, first served for ad-hoc openings while price differentials are low, but the equity concerns identified for Barmah, where faster Victorian processing results in almost all trades occurring between Victorian accounts, warrant ongoing monitoring. We recommend a clear review trigger so that ad-hoc openings can be brought under the scheduled randomisation arrangements if material price differentials or inequitable outcomes emerge” – Industry body

Reporting

The importance of post-opening reporting was expressed to support ongoing monitoring, improve transparency and build confidence in trade opening arrangements.

“To build confidence in the new arrangements, post-opening reporting should be published for each opening, including the number of applications, volumes sought and approved, success rates by participant size, and the extent of related-party trading” – Industry body

Alignment with allocation announcements

One stakeholder highlighted that the alignment of scheduled trade openings with allocation announcements creates unnecessary complexity. This aligns with previous feedback DEECA received particularly in relation to 1 July trade openings, that has indicated a preference for trade openings to occur only after the seasonal determination process has been completed. Stakeholders have noted the importance of allocations being credited to customer accounts before trade openings commence, enabling customers to make informed trading decisions based on their available allocation. Similar considerations apply to the scheduled Goulburn trade openings on 15 October and 15 December, where there is a preference for allocation announcements to be reflected in customer accounts before the trade opening processes begin.

Where to from here

Based on what we have heard during both stage 1 and 2 consultations, and the findings of the option assessment, WaterNSW and DEECA have developed a plan for implementation, that is outlined in this section.

Barmah scheduled trade openings

WaterNSW and DEECA will implement randomisation as the long-term approach for the 1 July scheduled trade openings at Barmah. This decision is based on the support provided by stakeholders during this consultation and aligns with the assessment findings that randomisation is the most suitable option for scheduled trade openings at Barmah.

The Barmah trade opening process will be consistent with the approach developed and trialled in July 2025 and July 2026. It will work as follows:

1. Trade applications are submitted to either WaterNSW or DEECA during a specified application window.
2. Applications are assessed against the eligibility requirements for the trade opening.
3. Eligible applications from both jurisdictions are combined into a single pool and treated equally, regardless of their state of origin.
4. A joint randomisation process determines the order in which applications will be processed.
5. Applications are processed in the determined order from a single, unified queue until the available trade opportunity is exhausted.
6. Applicants are notified of the outcome of their application following processing.

Further detail regarding the process is available on the [Victorian Water Register](#) website.

WaterNSW and DEECA will investigate opportunities to refine the supporting technical and business processes to improve efficiency and transparency, including opportunities to reduce administrative effort and costs.

WaterNSW and DEECA plan to continue the approach adopted in 2025 and 2026 of scheduling the Barmah trade opening on the first business day after 1 July. This will ensure participants will have access to opening season allocations and have been able to undertake preparatory activities before the application submission window opens.

There was some interest in introducing limits on how much someone can apply to trade during a randomised opening at Barmah to reduce the proportion of opportunity accessed by large holders. WaterNSW and DEECA acknowledge limits could improve perceived equity of options by preventing a large amount of trade opportunity in a single transaction, however, note that such limits would likely incentivise large water holders to split their applications which, to some extent they already do, to increase the chances of success. WaterNSW and DEECA will continue to monitor the operation of the randomisation approach and consider whether any refinements to application arrangements are warranted.

WaterNSW and DEECA will also continue to monitor ad hoc trade openings at Barmah and consider when the volume of trade upstream would reach a threshold that warrants a process other than first-in, first served. In this case the decision process to adopt randomisation should consider the expected level of competition for trade and assessment against the framework principles.

Goulburn scheduled trade openings

DEECA will implement randomisation as the long-term approach for scheduled Goulburn trade openings. This decision is based on the support provided by stakeholders during this consultation and aligns with the assessment findings that randomisation is the most suitable option for scheduled trade openings at Goulburn.

The Goulburn trade opening process will be consistent with the approach developed and trialled for scheduled openings since October 2024. It will work as follows:

1. Trade applications are submitted during a specified application window.
2. Applications are assessed against eligibility requirements for the trade opening.
3. Eligible applications are treated equally and entered into a randomisation process.
4. The randomisation process determines the order in which applications will be processed.
5. Applications are processed in the determined order until the available trade opportunity is exhausted.
6. Applicants are notified of the outcome of their application following processing.

Further detail regarding the process is available on the [Victorian Water Register](#) website.

DEECA will investigate opportunities to refine the supporting technical and business processes to improve efficiency, integrity and transparency. This will include considering aligning administrative processes with Barmah trade openings wherever practical and exploring additional automation opportunities for the Goulburn that would reduce administrative effort and costs, while improving market participant visibility of application status throughout the randomisation process.

In response to market participant feedback about the timing of Goulburn trade openings, DEECA will schedule Goulburn trade openings to occur on the first business day following the 1 July, 15 October and 15 December seasonal determination announcements. This updated approach will ensure that any allocation increase announced through the seasonal determination will be available for trade when the application submission window opens. It affects the timing of the trade opening only and does not affect how the available trade volume is determined.

There was more interest in introducing limits on how much someone can apply to trade during a randomised opening for Goulburn than Barmah trade openings. This is not surprising given that since October 2024 when randomisation was first trialled in the Goulburn, the largest trade applications (up to 10,000 ML) have been submitted in the Goulburn, and in July 2025 one large water holder (an environmental water holder) received 20% of the available trade opportunity. Given there is insufficient evidence at this stage that introducing limits on trade applications would improve equity of access, coupled with the practical challenges, DEECA does not plan to introduce volumetric limits in the short term, however, will continue to monitor the operation of the randomisation for Goulburn trade openings and consider whether any refinements to application arrangements are warranted.

In addition, DEECA acknowledges many stakeholders were concerned about why environmental water holders have applied for such a large proportion of the Goulburn trade opportunities since randomisation commenced, and strong interest in understanding why environmental water holders do this in light of the alternative mechanisms for them to move water from the Goulburn to the Murray. To address this concern DEECA will develop formal public guidance for statutory agencies, including environmental water holders, to guide their participation in the market. The guidelines will aim to support these agencies to participate in the market and competitive trade openings in a transparent manner while addressing concerns about their actions distorting the market, creating unfair advantage and delivering overall public benefit.

Murrumbidgee trade openings

WaterNSW is currently reviewing the Murrumbidgee [processing arrangements](#). As part of this review, consideration is being given to replacing the current first-in, first served approach with a randomisation process. This aligns with the assessment findings that randomisation is the most suitable option, as it removes advantages associated with speed, automation and technological capability, while providing a broader application window that gives market participants more time to prepare and submit applications.

While there are some operational challenges associated with implementing randomisation, particularly as the Murrumbidgee system would be transitioning from a first-in, first served approach, these challenges will be explored in detail in the next phase of this project. Unlike the Barmah and Goulburn systems, where randomisation is already established practice, the Murrumbidgee market would require a period of adjustment. To support this transition, WaterNSW would undertake a comprehensive communication and stakeholder engagement program prior to any changes being introduced, ensuring market participants have sufficient time to understand and adapt to the new process. While first-in, first served has been an effective and well-understood approach for Murrumbidgee trade openings, randomisation would provide market participants with greater time to observe market conditions, consider their trading needs and prepare applications. This supports more informed decision-making while removing advantages associated with speed and submission timing.

Ongoing monitoring and transparency of trade opportunities

DEECA and WaterNSW will continue to monitor the operation of trade openings to ensure arrangements continue to provide equitable access, efficient administration and meet the needs and expectations of water market participants. This monitoring will include consideration of:

- Ad hoc trade openings
- Other scheduled trade openings (e.g. trade out of the Broken system in Victoria)
- If the Barmah, Goulburn or Murrumbidgee trade openings become less contested, whether reverting to the simpler first-in, first served approach would become more efficient and appropriate.

Reporting on all scheduled trade openings will continue in line with the Barmah and Goulburn post trade reports and publication of statements from randomisation observer (the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission) available on the [Victorian Water Register](#) website. As part of the final year of the project, WaterNSW will review opportunities to strengthen post-opening reporting and improve transparency for market participants in relation to Murrumbidgee trade activity.”

Appendices

Appendix 1 – Engagement summary

Audience	Description	Date
Victorian Water Register News Item	News Item posted and emailed to subscribers informing options assessments and consultation opportunities	18 May 2026
WaterNSW email to news subscribers	Email sent to 843 market participant news subscribers to inform of options assessment and consultation opportunities	18 May 2026
Public webinar	Joint public webinar including question-and-answer session. A recording of the webinar is available on Engage Victoria	21 May 2026
Lower Murray Water Customer Strategic Advisory Committee	Presentation at Committee meeting in Mildura	25 May 2026
Mallee Irrigator Shed Meeting Robinvale	Presentation to irrigators and community members as part of Mallee Irrigator Shed meetings in Robinvale	26 May 2026
Mallee Irrigator Shed Meeting Boundary Bend	Presentation to irrigators and community members as part of Mallee Irrigator Shed meetings in Boundary Bend	26 May 2026
Murray-Darling Basin Trade Working Group	Joint online presentation at Working Group meeting	27 May 2026
Mallee Irrigator Shed Meeting Lindsay Point	Presentation to irrigators and community members as part of Mallee Irrigator Shed meetings in Lindsay Point	27 May 2026
Mallee Irrigator Shed Meeting Nangiloc	Presentation to irrigators and community members as part of Mallee Irrigator Shed meetings in Nangiloc	28 May 2026
Mallee Irrigator Shed Meeting Irymple	Presentation to irrigators and community members as part of Mallee Irrigator Shed meetings in Irymple	28 May 2026
Goulburn Murray Water Customer Committee	Online presentation	5 June 2026
Shepparton Irrigation Regional Forum	Presentation at SIRC meeting in Shepparton	10 June 2026
Australian Water Brokers Association	Online presentation	12 August 2026